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YUK HUI 
The Computational Turn, or, a New Weltbild
The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. The word 
‘picture’ (Bild) now means the structured image (Gebild) that is the creature of man’s producing 
which represents and sets before.
Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” 1977.1
Theorists, whether from the arts or the sciences, tend to set up a ‘turn’ as an epochal change, a 
radical shift in the perception of the world; for example, a linguistic turn, or a computational turn. But 
how is the world unveiled in such a turn beyond all its obviousness? What are the metaphysical or 
even metaphorical meanings characterised in such a turn? These questions prompt us to look back 
at the origin or foundation of distinctions between humans and their technologies. A trajectory to 
the past may excite us with the evolutionary progress of humankind but, at the same time, discloses 
its limitations and poverty. 
In this context, how can we understand the computational turn of the late twentieth century? 
We tend to see computation as simply a tool, or a part of technological culture. In the celebrated 
cognitive scientist’s Brian Canwell Smith’s 1998 influential book On the Origin of Objects, there is 
a small footnote: “computers are not cultures, at least not yet …”2 What then indicates something 
becoming a culture? Is it the fact that almost everyone in the West has a computer? Or that our 
everyday activities, ranging from talking to families to accessing a public toilet, rely on computation? 
Isn’t this too obvious or even too late to be pointed out? Haven’t we already missed the computational 
turn?
I want to propose here that a qualitative change has already taken place: the way we understand 
cultural dynamics is now identical with computational logic. It is not anymore a method, methodology, 
or tool but, more fundamentally, the way we see and act in the world. My thesis is simply this: let’s 
approach this computational turn from the question of the Weltbild, Heidegger’s world picture, a 
fundamental, intuitive and immediate understanding of the world, which projects its significance 
in every part of our life. Then, what exactly is a world picture?
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HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF WELTBILD
In his 1938 essay, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” Martin Heidegger first raised the question of the 
world picture. To Heidegger, what characterises the world picture is not the picture of the world, 
but the world “conceived and grasped as a picture.”3 The world picture presents us the problem of 
the world and truth; that is to say, the objectification of the world as the concealment of the truth in 
the darkness. It is the way that we reduce the unseen to graspable entities. Heidegger’s assertion 
demands a retrospective of the historical development of Western metaphysics. Truth (Aletheia) for 
Heidegger has nothing to do with correctness, as in logic, but rather is an event; the unconcealment 
of the meaning of Being (Sein) through the encounters with beings (Seienden). This unconcealment 
can only be achieved when ‘beings’ are not simply objects which can be known and manipulated, 
but rather things which are not yet determined and remain open for the manifestation of Being. 
Truth is a revealing. Modern science and technology, as Heidegger diagnosed, have evacuated the 
possibility for the question of Being (Seinsfrage), since the world is conceived as an image, which is 
in front of and against human being, and waiting to be exploited. The ontological difference (being 
and Being, ontic and ontological) is totally left behind in history, and we come to the self-destruction 
of modernity. In “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger leaves us the melancholia of a prophet 
who has noticed an invisible power transforming humankind into a destiny hidden in the darkness, 
yet he remains helpless. Pondering upon what he sees as the gigantic force of modern science and 
technology, Heidegger writes:
The gigantic presses forward in a form that actually seems to make it disappear – in the annihilation 
of great distances by the airplane, in the setting before us of foreign and remote worlds in their 
everydayness, which is produced at random through radio by a flick of the hand. Yet we think 
too superficially if we suppose that the gigantic is only the endlessly extended emptiness of the 
purely quantitative. We think too little if we find that the gigantic, in the form of continual not-ever-
having-been-here-yet, originates only in a blind mania for exaggerating and excelling. We do not 
think at all if we believe we have explained this phenomenon of the gigantic with the catchword 
“Americanism.”
What Heidegger proposes is that this gigantic force is neither something imaginary, nor something 
imported from outside (for example, America: the country that at the time he wrote had pushed to 
the forefront of technological expansionism); but something originated within European culture, in 
other words, the destiny of Western history, or metaphysics. Yet time stops in Heidegger’s thought, 
as the prophet is not able to see through the power of the incalculable, the quasi-determinate nature 
of modern technology. In this article, Heidegger doesn’t explain to us the details of the picture; the 
events wither on the surface, as something merely present at hand. Indeed, Heidegger doesn’t identify 
the world picture as a differentiated stage of development of human knowledge, for example as a 
possible shift from the ancient to the medieval. Rather he poses it as the consequence of modern 
science and technology, which identifies with the metaphysics of our time: the world is represented 
and grasped as an image. Heidegger’s continued attempts to grasp this ontological understanding, 
and use it to reduce the ontic to something floating above the ontological, hindered him from going 
any further with a consistent theory of the world image. We will see later why this is problematic. 
If modern technology is to be understood, we cannot stop at the grasped itself, but rather address 
the shifts of the grasped as such. If Heidegger’s question of the measurement and graspability of 
technology is valid today, we have to ask again, what is the world picture? And we have to go beyond 
Heidegger by exploring the limits of his position and bring forth a new interpretation.
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THE MECHANICAL WORLD PICTURE
If Heidegger’s ontological difference has to be rethought, then the ontological cannot be posed 
as the absolute foundation of the ontic (physical or factual existence), rather the ontological and 
ontic must be conceived as a temporal unity. In other words, the meaning of existence itself has also 
to be hermeneutically understood. Here I want to contrast Heidegger with the Dutch Mathematician 
E. J. Dijksterhuis. In The Mechanization of the World Picture, Dijksterhuis investigates the history 
of the formation of world pictures from pre-Socrates to Newton.4 The world picture as ‘mechanics’ 
was concretised in 1687 after the publication of Newton’s Principia – an  understanding that lasted 
until the early twentieth century. Dijksterhuis argues that the mechanisation of the world picture is 
not solely a scientific method, but becomes the form of our culture. The success of the mechanical 
model pointed to both the scientific revolution, but also the capacity for change inherent within it. 
We can see here in the history of science and technology a redoubling of the world picture in vision 
and practice, those ruptures which Thomas Kuhn calls a ‘paradigm shift.’5 On the one hand, the 
world picture determines the thought behind science and technological development; on the other 
hand, the science and technology development reinforces and crystallises the world picture. This 
redoubling problematises the ontological difference between Being and beings, since the distinction 
is blurred in the sense that one cannot simply isolate one’s own understanding, as Heidegger did. 
By introducing the term ‘mechanization of the world picture,’ Dijksterhuis attempts to make such 
distinction clear, asking:
Are we in doing so thinking of the meaning ‘implement’ or ‘machine’, implied in the Greek term 
μηχανή, and considering the universe—the mind of man included or not—as a machine? Or does 
the term mean that natural events can be described with the aid of the concepts and dealt with 
by the methods of a branch of science that is called mechanics—the word here being used in 
quite a different sense and meaning the science of motion?6
This question cannot be answered by choosing one option, since the machine, and thus the 
world picture, is both. The world picture itself is always a redoubling. This process can only be 
disrupted by a rupture that completely rejects this world picture (and replaces it with another). 
In the twentieth century quantum mechanics was such a rupture, since it rejected the clarity and 
certainty of the Galileo–Newtonian models of classical mechanics. The world picture becomes a 
force which repels the movement of the whole culture, as we can see from molecular biology, the 
atomic bomb, particle accelerators, microchips, etc. The power of the world picture is frequently 
and perpetually undermined, because this process of replacement is core to scientific method. In 
his introduction, Dijksterhuis reminds us that:
owing to all these factors the mechanization of physical science has become much more than an 
internal question of method in natural science; it is a matter that affects the history of culture as 
a whole, and on this account, it deserves the attention of students outside the scientific world.7
Today we have to ask, what is the world picture of our time? There has been a shift from a 
mechanised world picture, based in analogue models of scientific thought, to one formed through 
the digital network based on patterns and repetitions of digital matter. It is a specific image of 
networks, which characterises the computational turn. On one hand, the networked world image 
of the computational turn bears an affinity to quantum mechanics’ concepts of uncertainty and 
complexity; on the other hand, it originates from the quotidian uses of telecommunication networks, 
concreted at the time when the Internet became an indispensible part of daily life (of course one 
can argue against the coverage and ubiquity of the Internet, but here we are dealing more with a 
paradigm). Network visualisation or analysis pervades all spheres of Western culture: computing, 
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sociology, philosophy, neuroscience, biology, art, etc. Mark Wigley has even characterised the network 
as a symptom: ‘Network Fever.’8 The question of the network seems to be self-evidential, and is 
already grounded in intersubjective understandings which don’t need further interrogation.9 This 
consensus is legitimated in our daily life, or what Scott Lash calls the technological form of life.10 
This consensus presents two effects: one is the effect of technological innovation and evolution; and 
the other is what Heidegger characterised as the completion of metaphysics in modern technology, 
specifically cybernetics.11 
The question now is where is this network image from? What do we mean by a networkisation of 
the world picture? What is the significance of a networked world picture to the understanding of our 
culture, especially if we are already immersed within the ‘computational turn?’ Furthermore, why does 
this new world picture bother us at all? The remainder of this essay will briefly bring this networked 
world picture into the light; hopefully this process will be sufficient to open up further critique and 
discussion. I will propose that two apparently distinct domains, namely communication networks 
and language, converge and fulfil this image of networks. The concept of network is not new, but 
what really brings this particular framing of the network to the fore is the computational turn.
NETWORK IMAGES AND HUMAN LANGUAGE
The most referred network models by computer scientists and cultural theorists are still those 
developed in the early 1960s by Paul Baran of RAND Cooperation. In Baran’s models networks are 
categorised as centralised, decentralised and distributed. The difference between decentralised 
and distributed requires elaboration here. In his 1964 essay “On Distributed Communications,” 
Baran proposes that a decentralised network is a hierarchical network with multiple centres, while a 
distributed one is a network without hierarchy. A distributed system contains many switching nodes 
linking to each other, with a redundancy in linkage ensuring the service of connection to the users. 
The files to be sent over the network are divided into small packets (called ‘datagrams’), which travel 
on the network from the sender and are received and reassembled in the receiver’s machine.12 As 
Abbate explains, in Baran’s model of a distributed network “there is no central control; only a simple 
local routing policy is performed at each node, yet the overall system adapts.”13 
Figure 1. Paul Baran, “Diagram 
of Centralized, Decentralized and 
Distributed Networks”, from the 
introduction to “On Distributed 
Communications Networks”, first 
presented in September 1962 
and subsequently published 
by RAND Corporation in their 
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In the more recent development of network topologies, especially in P2P networks, we can 
see other forms of networks dependant on the purposes of the distributed system. In 2004, the 
Hungarian physicist Albert-László Barabási showed that the World Wide Web has a scale-free 
topology, which demonstrates several characteristics, for example, the preferential growth of hubs 
and the power-law distribution.14
We can also relate this distributed image to the understanding of communication (or, more 
precisely, human communication). Baran’s dot-and-line structure has its origin in semiotics and 
language. Human communication since Aristotle has been understood as a coding machine which 
involves both encoding and decoding.15 Meaning is encoded and has to be decoded at the receiving 
end. This applies to signs as well as semantics.16 The coding machine is always relational, and each 
sign – though it may signify multiple meanings – nevertheless commits to a relation that one can 
link with a line. Coding and decoding, as Sperber and Wilson point out in Relevance: Communication 
and Cognition, is not a broad enough model to generalise the whole method of communication, since 
things such as “the time and place of utterances, the identity of the speaker, the speakers’ intention” 
cannot be included in the semantic meaning of the sentence.17 So there is another model needed, 
which Sperber and Wilson call the inferential model.18 The inferential model works separately with 
the coding model through logical inferences. It always has the tendency to reduce the meaning of 
sentences or words to propositions, in order to carry out logical operations. This inferential system 
is today what we can map as the XML data structure, the semantic web (a project proposed by Tim 
Berners-Lee ten years ago, also known as data web), or any formalised data set which allows the 
generation of relations and hence networks through logical inference.19 Berners-Lee writes,
I have a dream for the Web [in which computers] become capable of analyzing all the data on the 
Web – the content, links, and transactions between people and computers. A ‘Semantic Web’, 
which should make this possible, has yet to emerge, but when it does, the day-to-day mechanisms 
of trade, bureaucracy and our daily lives will be handled by machines talking to machines. The 
‘intelligent agents’ people have touted for ages will finally materialize.20
In the semantic web (popularly known as web 3.0), linked data forms a network that is once again 
visualised in the form of dots and lines. There are numerous similarities between Baran’s original 
models and the working principle of computer networks and the semantic web. For example, in the 
digital computer system, the message is chopped into packets as an encoding process and distributed 
to the network to be reassembled (decoded) and interpreted (inference) as a complete language. 
In the semantic web, the message is encoded according to specific ontology, and the machine will 
decode the message according to syntax specified by XML or RDF and infers the propositions to 
arrive at a solution. The semantic web is the ultimate vanguard of the computational turn.
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Figure 2.  Richard Cyganiak and Anja Jentzsch, “Linking Open Data cloud diagram,” (last updated 22 Sep 2010),  
http://richard.cyganiak.de/2007/10/lod/ Early version reproduced by Orchestr8 as the “alchemyAPI” (2009),  
http://www.alchemyapi.com/api/entity/ldata.png CC-BY-SA
DISCURSIVE NETWORKS AND THE ALTERMODERN
These kinds of network visualisation, or even network images, understood as the representation 
of ‘cultural dynamics,’ today rely on two foundations: the instrumental use of language (grounded in 
traditional logic) and different forms of network topologies.21 This double foundation was unthinkable 
in the mechanised world, since such a picture had always to be in order and finite. The shift from 
the mechanisation of the world picture to the networkisation indicated by the computational turn 
implies a renewed intuition of the world (Weltanschauung), a sophisticated, graspable, yet contingent 
dynamics. 
The computational turn shows us a network formed though increasing complexity, which is also 
discursive since it is based on logical language; in other words, it is a discursive network. The French 
cultural theorist and art critic Nicolas Bourriaud also uses the discursive network to characterise – 
what he calls – the Altermodern.22 The Altermodern emerges from the end of both the celebration 
of the modern and the mourning of the postmodern. According to Bourriaud’s analysis of art history, 
modernism substituted spatial perspective with temporal perspective, that is, history. The postmodern 
is refractory to both spatial and temporal perspectives, as in the mourning of the end of history. In 
a sense, Heidegger’s critique returns, situated in between the modern and postmodern, expressing 
the melancholia of the coming of destructive gigantic forces, which at this point are unknown to the 
philosopher. He prophesies the imminence of the postmodern: the mourning of the impossibility of 
returning to the origin of historicality (that is, violent destruction), because he sees the essence of 
technics shifting from the origin of poesis to what he calls enframing (Gestell).23 The transformation 
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is underlined by technological development, whose time is irreversible; that is to say, the forgetting 
of the ontological difference cannot be redeemed anymore. Human Dasein loses his/her place, 
or the There (Da) of his/her Being (Sein) in the world. This melancholia and the desire for origin 
corresponds to what Bourriaud understands as two stages of postmodernism: firstly, the oil crisis in 
1973, marked by the end of the 30 glorious years (1945-75); secondly, the “neurotic pre-occupation 
with origins typical of the year of globalization.”24
Bourriaud argues for the concept of the altermodern as the Zeitgeist of our time, which begins 
with the death of postmodernity. The groundlessness which we see in Heidegger becomes the ground 
of the altermodern: the abandoning of the question of origin in favour of “a positive vision of chaos 
and complexity.”25 For Bourriaud, the time of postmodernism is a “petrified kind of time advancing in 
loops” and the time of modernism is a “linear vision of history,” while the altermodern is “a positive 
experience of disorientation through an art-form exploring all dimensions of the present, tracing 
lines in all directions of time and space.”26 Altermodern history is a disorientation of the present. 
The term disorientation deserves our attention. It is not a fault – the sublimation of the forgetting, 
as Heidegger says – but the default of the origin of global culture.27 Here I must try to tighten the 
relation between the computational turn and this concept of the altermodern. As we saw above, firstly 
the modern concept of the network is technological and has its origin in the computer network as 
communication tool; secondly, discursive relations constitute a network by reducing time and space 
to the synchronisable clock time, which opens up a new dynamic of temporal and spatial experience. 
The altermodern, as I attempt to show here, reflects and co-constitutes the same world image. We can 
say that the ontological is not thinkable outside the technical reality, the ontic. For example, the use 
of technology dominates the discourse of the artworks Bourriaud uses to illustrate his theory: Simon 
Starling’s use of radio waves to relocate furniture designed by Francis Bacon from one continent to 
another; Franz Ankermann’s use of GPS to invent a new form of painting, etc. We can even push this 
suggestion further and state that the altermodern is legitimated by such a technological condition, 
that is, the computational turn. Indeed, the altermodern and the computational turn both share the 
disorientation of time and space. There are two implications here; firstly, the altermodern points 
to the lost of origin, and the proliferation of “cultural strata.”28 Secondly, it implies that time and 
space have lost their necessary correlation; for example, whereas within modernism an event was 
indicated by place ‘x,’ time ‘y,’ an event of place ‘x’ can now be linked to an event of time ‘z.’ This 
dissociation of time and space legitimate what Bourriaud calls the ‘heterochrony.’ 29
Bourriaud asks, “but what is a network?” He answers,
 A connected chain of distinct elements in time or space. Various materials can serve as a ‘glue’ to 
hold the component elements together, yet one of them today assumes a particular importance: 
story telling.30
In this sense, the network (both technical and cultural) reconciles the spatial and the temporal, 
and brings them together into a single narrative. Is this simply another story from the angel of 
history? We have to realise that this narrative acquires a new temporal form. It is different from Walter 
Benjamin’s storytelling, whose time is based on a mythical origin: the melancholia due to the passing 
away of the origin. Bourriaud’s storytelling doesn’t have an origin apart from the groundlessness 
of the global community. The ground (of the groundlessness) of Bourriaud’s storytelling is the 
computational turn, a networked re-ordering of time and space. It implies relations and connections 
which are only possible in a technological sense: globalisation; cosmo-exploration; communication 
networks; the overlapping of patterns of cultural dynamics, etc. 
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An artwork is not an object anymore, but a network. It is beyond the correlation between time and 
space, since it is discursive; it follows the logic of language, which is in turn only possible through 
network technology. Commenting on the artworks of Nathaniel Mellors, Olivia Plender, Ruth Ewan 
and Spartacus Chetwynd, Bourriaud makes this point explicit: 
References to the past are coordinated according to a system of cognitive logic. To understand the 
present means carrying out a kind of rough-and-ready archaeological investigation of world culture, 
which proceeds just as well through re-enactments as through the presentation of artefacts—or 
again, through the technique of mixing.31
In the altermodern, which I identify with the computational turn, cultural logic is identified with 
cognitive logic, and the technique of mixing implies a total disorientation in which “there is no longer 
cultural roots to sustain forms, no exact cultural base to serve as a benchmark for variations.”32 
Instead, language and network together produce a digital milieu, in which every form of connection 
is possible within imagination. I cannot go further into those artworks discussed by Bourriaud 
here; what we have to bear in mind is the strong sense of the digital milieu which promises the 
connectiveness of space and time within an image. What allows such a dynamic is exactly this 
connectivity, or discursiveness:
the discursive is a production cycle, rather than a fixed performative moment in time … It occupies 
the increasing gap between the trajectory of modernity (understood here as a flow of technologies 
and demographic development) and the somewhat melancholic imploded self-conscious trajectory 
of modernism.33
The discursive network is dynamic. It doesn’t confine itself to a fixed status. It allows the network 
to expand as new members join, to reorder when time goes by, to include what is said whenever 
they speak in a logical language. It means we can always define ‘same as’ and ‘different from’ as 
different entities.34 If the altermodern is the celebration of our age, then the image of the network 
as world picture is its symbol, indicating its triumph. It is no more true that one has to understand 
the complexity and dynamic of the world and culture in terms of a discursive network than it is the 
world itself which is already grounded in such an intuition. 
THE SHADOW OF HEIDEGGER AND THE LOGIC OF CULTURE
The artists in this sense are becoming nomads, or more precisely Viatorise, who transcend the 
temporal–spatial limitation of events.35 This nevertheless is not new to us. Indeed, Deleuze and 
Guattari developed the concept of the rhizome as a new organisational structure against trees and 
taxonomies in A Thousand Plateaus.36 The rhizome is at the same time a smooth plane which belongs 
to the nomads, who demand speed and acceleration. Deleuze and Guattari’s critique should also 
be understood as a response to the technological milieu of their time. We have to remember that, 
from the 1960s onward until the rise of connectionism in cybernetics in the 1980s, the concept of 
hierarchy plays one of the most important roles in cybernetics, especially in the work of Herbert A. 
Simon and the early Noam Chomsky.37 Deleuze and Guattari opposed these smooth spaces with 
striations, organisational structures that in some senses seem to prefigure the semantic web. On 
the other hand, Bourriaud attempts to be critical of the concept of network by asking “whether the 
era of the worldwide web and global hypermobility is really giving rise to new ways of perceiving 
human space?”38 He answers positively with the ‘altermodern’– the affirmation of a disorientation 
characterised by speed and acceleration. In other words, the altermodern is the affirmation of a 
technological sublime. This means that those who embraced Deleuze and Guattari have to remind 
themselves that the time of ‘rhizome against tree’ or the recognition of ‘non-linearity over linearity’ is 
49Junctures 13, December 2010
over. Now we are moving to a new tension: the celebration of networks and a new critique yet to come. 
The ‘Altermodern’ to us is a new world picture, which must be posed as a limit to be transcended.
In 1938, Heidegger saw the advent of the world picture as a closing down of human history, 
namely the instrumental use of language as a mere communication tool in cybernetics and the 
understanding of things as graspable entities or networks. We can identify this trajectory from the 
early Heidegger’s critique of symbolic logic in the 1920s through to the later Heidegger’s defence 
of the non-thematic thing, and finally actualised in “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954). 
Heidegger’s attempt to re-establish a ground for modern culture by separating the ontological 
from the ontic renders this aspect of his critique insufficient for cultural analysis. Dijksterhuis’ 
work is a crucial extension of the critique of the ontological difference, which subsumes the ontic 
to the ontological. In the process Dijksterhuis gives us a model of mechanisation equal to that of 
the network. In Technics and Time V.1 Bernard Stiegler exposes the forgetting of the ontic within 
Heidegger’s own thought, and unveils that the ontic consists of the ‘already there’ and thus must 
be conceived as the default of origin.39 The world image exposes both the insight and contradiction 
in Heidegger’s own thought: the danger of posing the world as an image and the limitation of his 
understanding of the ontological difference.
Under such circumstances, it probably seems strange or even unrealistic to bring Heidegger’s 
critique back to the computational turn, since the turn already announces his failure, or renounces 
it as the mourning of the postmodern. Yet the critique from Heidegger remains a shadow in the 
celebration of the altermodern, the networkisation and datafication as the disorientation of the 
globe.40 There is a paradoxical logic here; on the one hand, we believe that we already understand 
the world in its networked form, and we are able to grasp it, and predict its movements through 
the harvest of data; on the other hand, a network form also implies contingency and the difficulty 
to be totalised and subsumed to control. This indeed justifies one’s affinity to this particular world 
image: it is at the same time inside and outside our control and knowledge; like the sublime in the 
face of the gigantic, it is a feeling of pleasure without guilt.
Finally, whether the logic of culture or the world can be understood as the logic of computation 
remains doubtful in two senses. Firstly, there is the question of truth proposed by Heidegger. The 
thematic-logical identification of the world through language implies a closure of the meaning of 
Being. The human conceals himself or herself in the discursive network; this cannot be dismissed 
as mythical, but is a reminder of techno-logo-centrism. Secondly, the question of cultural dynamics 
identified with the discursive network, a hermeneutic logic that says that every phenomenon supposes 
the image of the network; a redoubling of which creates a new culture, which furthermore follows on 
from what is presupposed by this image. This is what Dijksterhuis gives us; the blurring in between 
the ontological and the epistemological, and the world image becoming the mechanised momentum 
of cultural development. I am not here making a judgement of the computational turn, nor do I 
propose to negate the computational turn through a Heideggerian logic, which is an impossible task. 
The computational turn brought new possibilities and imaginations, also practicality to the world, 
something that must not be denied. Yet it demands a metaphysical understanding of its position 
in the global culture. I have proposed here a way of looking at the computational turn through the 
formation of the new world image, and have identified its philosophical and metaphysical meanings 
through an analysis of Bourriaud’s altermodern alongside a discussion of network technology. As the 
new time demands a new world image, it also demands a new metaphysical reflection. Bourriaud 
and network technology both give us a different kind of Weltbild, a discursive, potentially emergent 
construction where an artwork is no longer an object, and where a network forms only temporarily 
in the gaps between one ‘turn’ and another. In the end, we may even forget asking what else can 
escape such a network image, after the computational turn?
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